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Abstract 
The face communicates an impressive amount of visual information. We use it to identify its 
owner, how they are feeling and to help us understand what they are saying. Models of face 
processing have considered how we extract these kinds of meaning from the face but have 
ignored another important facial signal - eye gaze. However, recent neurophysiological and 
developmental studies have sparked some interest in the perception of gaze on the part of 
cognitive psychologists. In this article we begin by reviewing evidence suggesting that the eyes 
may constitute a special stimulus in at least two senses. First the structure of the eyes may have 
evolved to provide us with a particularly powerful signal to the direction in which someone is 
looking, and second, we may have evolved neural mechanisms devoted to their processing. As a 
result, gaze direction is analysed rapidly and automatically, and is able to trigger reflexive shifts 
of an observer's visual attention. Although the eyes are an undoubtedly important cue, 
understanding where another individual is directing their attention involves more than simply 
analysing their gaze direction. We go on to describe research with adult participants, children 
and non-human primates suggesting that other cues such as head orientation and pointing 
gestures make significant contributions to the computation of another's direction of attention. 
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Since the early 1980's, considerable progress has been made in understanding the perceptual, 
cognitive and neurological processes involved in deriving various different kinds of meaning 
from the human face1,2. For example, we now have a much better understanding of the operations 
involved in recognising a familiar face, categorising the emotional expression carried by the 
face, and of how we are able to use the configuration of the lips, teeth and tongue to help us 
interpret what the owner of a face is saying to us. In their influential model of face processing 
Bruce and Young3 proposed that these three types of meaning - identity, expression and facial 
speech - are extracted in parallel by functionally independent processing systems, a suggestion 
for which there is now converging empirical support4 (though see Walker et al.5 and 
Schweinberger & Soukup6 for some complications).  
However, in common with other cognitive models of face processing, Bruce and Young's 
account neglected a number of additional facial movements that convey important meaning and 
make substantial contributions to interpersonal communication. One such signal - gaze - has 
been widely studied by social psychologists who have long known that it is used in functions 
such as regulating turn-taking in conversation, expressing intimacy, and exercising social 
control7. Despite this, interest in the perceptual and cognitive processes underlying the analysis 
of gaze and gaze direction has only emerged in recent years, perhaps stimulated by the work of 
Perrett8,9 and Baron- Cohen10,11 
Perrett and his colleagues have proposed a model which is based on neurophysiological 
research which we outline later in this article, and describes how we combine information from 
gaze, head and body to determine where another individual is directing their attention (see Box 
4). Baron-Cohen's account has a wider scope, he proposes a "mindreading" system comprising a 
collection of modules which have evolved to enable humans to attribute mental states to one 
another (see Box 1). One of these modules functions specifically to detect another's gaze 
direction and attributes the mental state of "seeing" to the gazer. By implicating the perception of 
gaze in our understanding of what another person is attending to, or what they are thinking 
about, these researchers highlight the potentially central role played by the perception and 
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interpretation of gaze in the processes of social cognition. Central to both models is the 
importance of eye gaze as a cue to the direction of another's attention. Eye gaze cues override 
head and posture cues in Perrett's account, and in Baron-Cohen's model, the ability to use gaze 
direction to establish joint attention underpins the development of a theory of mind. Here we 
briefly review the evidence for these models which have rendered gaze perception an important 
issue in contemporary cognitive research. We argue that the emphasis on eye gaze within these 
models has led to the neglect of other important cues from head, posture and gesture, in the 
perception and computation of attention direction. 
------------------------- 
Box 1 - Baron-Cohen 
------------------------- 
The Perception and Detection of Gaze 
Humans and many other species tend to look at things in their environment that are of 
immediate interest to them. You might be the recipient of another's gaze, for instance, because 
you are a potential meal, a mate or simply because you are someone with whom they would like 
to interact. Individuals who are able to detect rapidly when they are the object of another's 
attention, and who can analyse exactly where another's gaze is directed therefore have 
considerable adaptive advantage. How might evolution have equipped us to deal with this 
problem? First, we may have evolved dedicated brain mechanisms for recovering the relevant 
information from another's eyes early in visual processing. A second possibility is that the 
physical structure of the eye may have evolved in such a way that eye direction is particularly 
easy for our visual systems to perceive. Indeed, recent work suggests that the output of simple 
cells found in the visual cortex can, in principle, signal the direction of gaze (see Box 2). Of 
course these two viewpoints are not necessarily mutually exclusive; the eye may be a special 
stimulus and we may have evolved brain mechanisms to perceive it. 
------------------------- 
Box 2 - Watt 
5  
------------------------- 
As part of his "mindreading" model, Baron-Cohen emphasises the latter position. He has 
proposed the existence of an Eye Direction Detector (EDD) in humans, a functionally specialised 
module devoted to the task of detecting eyes, and computing where in the environment eye-gaze 
is directed. Whether or not such a specialised system exists, we might expect the eyes to form a 
special kind of stimulus that we are able to process rapidly and obligatorily, and to which we are 
particularly sensitive. If Baron-Cohen's position is correct, we might expect these behavioural 
properties to be underpinned by some specialised neural circuitry tailored to processing the eyes 
and the direction in which they are gazing. In the remainder of this section we describe some of 
the evidence for these claims. 
The ability to process eyes and eye-like stimuli appears to develop very early in humans. By 
the age of 2 months infants show a preference for looking at the eyes over other regions of the 
face12, and by 4 months they are able to discriminate between direct and averted gaze13. Evidence 
of this sort doesn't mean that the ability to detect gaze is "hardwired" or present from birth, but it 
does suggest that by the time infant's visual acuity is sufficiently developed they show a 
particular preference for the eyes. By adulthood, subjects in experiments are extremely efficient 
at searching for a direct gaze amongst an array of distracting leftward and rightward gazes, 
significantly more so than they are at searching for equivalent geometric control stimuli14. This 
suggests that the ability to detect the eyes and the direction of gaze could be based on more than 
basic low-level perceptual abilities such as visual acuity and contrast sensitivity (but see Box 2). 
Fodor15 argued that putative modules should, in addition to a number of other criteria, 
operate rapidly and mandatorily (see Coltheart16 for a recent discussion of modularity). Thus, if 
we are to take seriously the notion of a gaze module we must show that the processing of gaze 
also occurs rapidly and obligatorily. Some evidence for this is provided by a recent set of studies 
that have demonstrated that gaze cues are able to trigger an automatic and rapid shifting of the 
focus of a viewer's visual attention. In one study17, three month old infants turned their eyes to a 
target faster if the location of that target had just been cued by an adult's gaze direction. Other 
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studies18-20 have used the more traditional cueing paradigm devised by Posner21 where 
participants are asked to make a response to a target stimulus whose location may or may not 
have been cued, for example, by the orientation of a head and/or the direction of eye-gaze (see 
Box 3). These experiments have shown that gaze cues will trigger rapid, reflexive shifts of adult 
participants' visual attention, even when the gaze direction does not predict the likely location of 
a target stimulus, and when participants are explicitly asked to ignore these cues. 
Gaze cues therefore seem to be processed obligatorily and cause viewers' attention to be 
shifted toward the cued region. This has the effect of facilitating the processing of any target 
which subsequently appears in that location, and somehow primes an infant's eye-movement 
response in that direction. What is remarkable about these findings is that in the experimental 
psychology literature only cues presented in the periphery of participants' visual fields have been 
found to exert these kinds of reflexive orienting effects (see Box 3). Arrows presented in the 
centre of a computer screen, for instance, do not trigger reflexive shifts22. Attention generally 
seems to be pulled toward brief peripheral visual onsets but social cues seem to be unique in 
causing attention to be automatically pushed in the direction they indicate. 
------------------------- 
Box 3 - Cueing 
and Box 4- Perrett 
------------------------- 
Finally, neurophysiological and neuropsychological work has provided some evidence for 
the existence of a neural system dedicated to processing the direction of gaze. Using a technique 
that enables the activity of a single nerve cell to be recorded, Perrett and his co-workers have 
identified certain cells in the STS region of the macaque temporal lobe which respond maximally 
to the particular direction in which the eyes in that face are looking (See Box 4). For example, 
one population of cells fire with maximum frequency when the monkey sees another individual 
gazing upwards, and another population of cells respond well to gazes directed downwards9,23 
Moreover, when this region of the macaque cortex is removed these monkeys are unable to make 
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gaze direction judgements, but nevertheless perform well on a number of other face processing 
tasks24. Humans suffering damage to the equivalent part of the brain have also been shown to be 
impaired in gaze recognition tasks25,24. 
The above evidence suggests that gaze direction may indeed be analysed quickly, and that 
gaze direction apparently cannot be ignored - it seems to trigger reflexive shifts in an observer's 
visual attention. The extent to which such effects are due to specialisation of the internal 
perceptual machinery, the nature of the eye itself and the signals it sends, or both requires further 
consideration (cf Box 2). 
The Importance of Other Cues 
Whatever the reasons for our sensitivity to shifts in eye-gaze we must not neglect other cues. 
Where someone is perceived as directing their attention may depend, not just on the direction of 
eye gaze, but on the orientation of their head, the posture of the body and perhaps where they are 
pointing their finger. It has been suggested that these cues are all processed automatically by 
observers and all make contributions to decisions about another individual's social attention. 
Experimental Studies with Adults 
As long ago as 1824, William Wollaston26 noted that judgements of gaze direction are not 
based solely on the position of the iris and pupil relative to the whites of the eyes. Wollaston's 
original drawings and our own images (see Figure 1) clearly demonstrate how head orientation 
can influence the perception of gaze. More recently, several authors have systematically 
investigated this phenomenon. In general, this work has established two types of effect. First, the 
perceived direction of gaze can be "towed" toward the orientation of the head. In this case, as 
with the Wollaston images, the direction of gaze is perceived to be somewhere between the angle 
of the head and the true line of regard of the eyes27,28. The second kind of influence of head angle 
on the perception of gaze is a kind of overshoot effect. Imagine someone standing in front of you 
with their head 30 degrees or so to your right and with their eyes either staring straight back at 
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you, or back towards your left shoulder. Under these conditions, you might perceive their eyes to 




Regardless of whether perceived gaze is towed towards the head, or appears to overshoot its 
target, the point is that the perception of gaze must be based on some combination of 
information extracted from the eyes and information extracted from the orientation of the head. 
However, at later stages of information processing we also see that computing where another 
individual is directing their attention depends on a number of further social cues. In fact, some of 
the neurophysiological work described earlier has hinted that this might indeed be the case23. As 
described earlier, these studies indicated that certain cells in the macaque temporal cortex 
respond strongly to certain gaze orientations. However, these same cells were also found to be 
sensitive to conjunctions of eye, head and body position, suggesting that all of these cues might 
contribute to the processing of attention direction. Moreover, Perrett and his colleagues have 
suggested how these cues might contribute to the computation of attention direction. They 
contend that information from gaze, head and body is combined hierarchically in a mechanism 
they called the Direction of Attention Detector (DAD). In this model, attention direction will be 
signalled by the eyes if these are visible, but if they are obscured, or if the face is viewed at too 
great a distance, the head will carry the burden of signalling attention direction. If for some 
reason, information from the eyes and head is unavailable, attention direction is signalled by the 
orientation of the body (see Box 4). Thus, although the model stresses that other cues are 
involved in the computation of attention direction, these cues play a relatively minor role 
compared to the part played by the eyes.  
Experimental work with human subjects is also beginning to indicate that decisions about the 
direction of another's attention are based on a number of different cues31,32. However, this 
research has lead to some rather different conclusions concerning the way in which these signals 
Face Lab
Comment [1]: Actually there are two 
Anstis effects. 1) the "overshoot" effect 
described and 2) the constant error of 
overestimation which occurs when head is 
straight ahead. 
9  
contribute to the computation of attention direction. In some of these experiments the directional 
cues of interest are placed into conflict in a Stroop-type interference paradigm. In one study, 
participants were shown the stimuli illustrated in Figure 2 one at a time on a computer screen 
and, in one block of trials, they were asked to push a button on a keyboard contingent on the 
direction of the eye gaze. Although participants were asked to ignore the orientation of the head, 
the results indicated that they were unable to do so. Reaction times (RTs) were faster when the 
eye gaze and head were oriented in the same direction than when they were oriented in opposite 
directions. An identical pattern of results was obtained when participants were asked to do the 
opposite task, that is respond on the basis of the orientation of the head and ignore the direction 
of eye gaze (see Figure 3). In a second experiment, participants were again presented with the 
stimuli shown in Figure 2, but this time they were asked to ignore these images and to make their 
responses contingent on a spoken directional word (either "up", "down", "left" or "right") which 
was presented at the same time as each face. Head and eye gaze cues were found to exert equal 
and independent effects on the speed of participants' responses to the spoken words. So on 
hearing the word "up", participants responded faster when they saw the gaze and head oriented 
upwards compared with trials when the head and eye gaze were directed downwards. However, 
this effect was completely eliminated when the head and gaze were oriented in opposite 
directions.  
------------------------- 
Figures 2 & 3 
------------------------- 
The results of these two experiments clearly suggest that participants process the directional 
information provided by the orientation of the head as well as that provided by the angle of eye 
gaze. In addition, they process both sources of information in parallel even when the 
experimental task demands that they attend to information in a completely different modality. 
Finally, the findings of these experiments suggest that head and gaze are more equal partners in 
the computation of attention direction than predicted by Perrett's DAD model where information 
from the head is overridden by the direction of eye gaze. 
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Other studies have indicated that, in addition to head and eye gaze cues, pointing gestures 
also contribute to decisions about the direction of another's attention. These cues also produce 
interference effects on responses to spoken directional words33 and seem to be processed 
automatically and in parallel with directional cues provided by the head and eyes32. Taken 
together with the studies described above, it seems as though observers process directional cues 
provided by the eyes, the head, and pointing gestures, and do so in parallel so that all this 
information is available when a decision has to be made about where another individual is 
directing their attention. Clearly these other cues play a greater role in this computation than they 
do in Perrett's DAD model, and in Baron-Cohen's mindreading system which makes no reference 
to any other visual cues to attention direction.  
Developmental Studies 
Baron-Cohen contends that eyes form a particularly salient feature for the developing infant. 
This may be so, however a number of studies with young children have shown that secondary 
cues such as head orientation and pointing gestures might actually be more salient signals to the 
direction of another's attention than eye-gaze direction alone. In gaze following experiments, 
children sit in front of their mothers who attempt to engage them in eye contact. Having done so, 
the mothers shift their eyes and/or turn their heads away from the child and their following 
behaviour is observed. Using this procedure studies have shown that infants as young as 3 - 6 
months are able to follow a combination of head and eye cues34,35, but it is not until between 14 - 
18 months that they show any indication of following eye cues alone36. Prior to 14 - 18 months it 
seems as though children actually ignore the orientation of the eyes and simply use the position 
of the head as an attention following cue37. 
What is not clear from many gaze following studies is whether or not the child actually 
understands the mental experience of their mother. Can the child who follows their mother's 
gaze to a target object actually represent the fact that the mother "sees" that particular object, or 
is the behaviour simply an example of the kind of reflexive attentional orienting mechanism 
observed in the precueing studies described earlier? In order to explore whether young children 
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are able to use attentional cues such as eye gaze to infer another's mental state researchers have 
used a different kind of task. Children were shown a picture of a face gazing at one of four 
objects and are asked "which one is Sam looking at?". In general, children of around 2 - 3 years 
failed this task, whereas children of around 4 years and older performed well indicating that the 
latter but not the former are able to infer the mental state of "seeing" from another's gaze 
direction38-40. However, the performance of the younger children was dramatically improved 
when the gaze cues were presented in concert with cues from the orientation of the head, or were 
replaced by pointing gestures40. 
In summary, children are able to follow head cues and use information from the orientation 
of the head to choose which object is being looked at before they are able to perform these tasks 
on the basis of eye direction alone. Thus although sensitive to gaze from an early age, it seems as 
though children are most influenced by information from other individuals' gestures and head 
orientation in order to engage in joint visual attention and gather information about the world.  
The Perception of Gaze by Non-Human Primates 
Comparative work with non-human primates also suggests that the orientation of the head 
might provide a stronger cue to another's attention direction than eye-gaze alone. In some of 
these studies animals had to learn to use an experimenter's attention cues in order to obtain food 
hidden under one of two objects. Despite undergoing extensive training, capuchin monkeys were 
unable to use an experimenter's gaze cues in order to make the correct object choice, but learnt to 
make use of pointing gestures and a combination of head and gaze cues in order to perform the 
task successfully41. Monkeys also failed to orient spontaneously to experimenter-given eye, head 
or pointing cues in gaze-following experiments similar to those used with human infants42, but 
are able to follow eye plus head cues of another individual of the same species43. Thus, monkeys 
need eye-gaze cues to be accompanied by a turn of the head in order to provoke a gaze following 
response, or to enable them to obtain a reward in an object choice task. In contrast to non-ape 
species, there is evidence that  chimpanzees are able to make use of eye gaze cues in both types 
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of study 42,44,45. However, in the object-choice task they required fewer sessions to reach criterion 
using pointing cues and head/gaze turns than when learning to use gaze-only cues44. 
In general then, it seems that turns of the head are more important cues, at least for monkeys, 
than movements of the eyes alone. However, this conclusion is perhaps not all that surprising 
given what we now know about the external morphology of the primate eye. Unlike humans, 
primates do not have a widely exposed white sclera surrounding a much darker iris46. In most 
species the colour of the sclera is rather similar to that of the skin around the eyes so that, 
compared with humans, the direction of gaze will be relatively camouflaged, perhaps in order to 
deceive predators, prey, or even fellow primates who might be in competition for scarce 
resources. We humans may have evolved eyes with a greater contrast between iris and sclera 
precisely because the risk of predation is minimal, and the benefits of an enhanced gaze signal in 
terms of communication and co-operation far outweigh the cost of an inability to deceive. 
Conclusion 
Recent interest in the study of gaze and social attention on the part of cognitive psychologists 
has been sparked, in part, by the work of Baron-Cohen and Perrett. These researchers have 
proposed somewhat different models, linked by the fact that in each, the detection of eye-gaze 
and gaze direction plays a pivotal role. Our own research has confirmed the importance of cues 
from direction of gaze. Such cues cannot be ignored even when they are irrelevant to the task in 
hand, and can create reflexive shifts in visual attention. However, recent experimental work with 
adults, children and non-human primates has suggested that the orientation of the head makes a 
larger contribution to the processing of another's direction of attention than these models allow. 
Studies have shown that the perception of gaze direction depends on the orientation of the 
surrounding face, whilst others have demonstrated that observers process head and gesture cues 
automatically and that this information contributes to decisions about social attention direction.  
Thus, it is clear that the models proposed by Perrett and Baron-Cohen need some 
modification. In line with this, Perrett and Emery have already suggested that Baron-Cohen 
replace his Eye Direction Detector with something akin to their Direction of Attention Detector 
13  
in order to take account of the neurophysiological findings. However, it is equally clear that the 
DAD itself needs some modification if it is to accommodate the experimental evidence reviewed 
in this paper.  
Outstanding Questions 
• How does the social attention computation fit in with the Bruce and Young3 framework for 
face processing? Should the putative Direction of Attention Detector be considered as part of the 
face processing system? The evidence that body movements (posture and hand gestures) may 
contribute information to the computation of social attention direction is problematic for this 
view.  
• How do we combine the directional information extracted from the various cues at the 
perceptual level of analysis and at later stages of processing where decisions are computed? Is 
the information actually integrated or combined, or does the context provided by one cue 
somehow modulate the processing of the other cues? How does the system code the orientation 
of the head? 
• How do we disambiguate gaze cues? Shifts of gaze and/or turns of the head serve a number 
of different functions. They can act as intentionally communicative signals, illustrating the 
referent of a remark, disambiguating deictic expressions such as "this one" or "that one", 
expressing intimacy or dominance, or communicating various emotional states11. But gaze shifts 
need not be intentionally communicative at all - for example when we gaze upwards when 
thinking. Given all the different functions, and the range of meanings the eyes and head might 
express, it is difficult to imagine how we are able, in the most part, to interpret just what 
another's gaze actually means. Do different kinds of signals have different spatial and temporal 
properties which can be used to disambiguate their meaning?  
• How does context influence the perception and interpretation of gaze? A sudden shift of 
gaze is likely to mean one thing in a conversation but something entirely different during a tennis 
match. More locally, the context provided by a verbal utterance during a conversation might also 
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influence how gaze, head and gesture are interpreted, something children seem able to 
understand when learning new words47. The context provided by the facial expression might also 
be important. A direct gaze coupled with an angry expression probably means something entirely 
different to a similar gaze married to a smile.  
• What is the relationship between the social function of gaze and its primary cognitive 
function for the gazer - to foveate and hence analyse in depth a region of the visual world? One 
recent theory elaborates the role of gaze as a deictic, focussing processing agendas selectively 
and serially48. Can we develop this "active vision" perspective and consider how joint attention, 
achieved by the perception of another person's gaze leads to the coordination of different 
individual processing agendas?  
• How do we avoid processing overloads when social signals compete with other cognitive 
processing? Some recent research suggests that concurrent social signals can interfere with 
ongoing complex cognitive tasks, such as solving difficult mental arithmetic problems or 
remembering hard-to-retrieve items49. Children may suffer interference from visual social signals 
in some circumstances, where adults would avert their gaze to avoid such conflicts (Doherty-
Sneddon et al., unpublished study). 
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 Box 1. The Mindreading System 
Humans and the vast majority of primate species are social animals, living in groups 
comprising as many as 200 individuals. Thriving in such an environment requires a particular 
kind of "social intelligence"; an ability to make sense of another individual's actions and 
crucially, to predict what they are about to do next. Several authors have argued that we humans 
are able to do this because we have evolved the ability to read the behaviours of others in terms 
of mental states such as knowing and believinga,b. Each of us acts on what we know is true, 
believe to be true or sometimes pretend to be true about the world. Baron-Cohenc,d has proposed 
the existence of a "mindreading" system which functions to make these mental state attributions 
to other agents. When fully developed it comprises four components (Fig.1); the Intentionality 
Detector (ID), the Eye Direction Detector (EDD), the Shared Attention Mechanism (SAM), and 
the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM). Each is considered to be a cognitive "module" sharing 
many, though not all, of the properties of modularity described by Fodor in his influential worke 
The ID, according to Baron-Cohen, is a primitive perceptual mechanism that interprets self-
propelled motion stimuli in terms of its desires and goals. For instance, it is this mechanism 
which allows us to infer that a cat chasing a mouse "wants" to eat the mouse. The second 
mechanism is the EDD which has three basic functions. It detects the presence of eyes or eye-
like stimuli, it computes the direction of gaze based on the position of the iris in the surrounding 
sclera, and finally it attributes the mental state of "seeing" to an agent whose eyes are directed 
toward itself or toward another object or agent. Thus, by the age of about 9 months when the ID 
and EDD are considered to be fully functioning, an infant is able to read another individual's 
behaviour in terms of their goals and desires, and understands that these individuals "see" the 
things to which their eyes are directed. What the infant cannot do at this stage is link the two 
mechanisms, that is,  understand that people often look at the things they want or are about to act 
on. This feat is achieved by the SAM which is fully developed between 9 and 18 months. 
Although it serves to link the ID and the EDD, the SAM's main function is to identify when the 
self and another are attending to the same thing. Essentially it uses information from the EDD - 
 that another individual is looking at, say, a bus - and compares this with the self's current 
perceptual state. If the two match, visual attention is shared. The SAM therefore enables its 
possessor to engage in a "meeting of minds", the recognition that you and another are sharing the 
same mental state - in this case that of "attending to", "seeing", "wanting" or the state of having a 
particular goal. Baron-Cohen suggests that this primitive meeting of minds triggers, from 
between 18 and 48 months, the development of the final module in the mindreading system, the 
ToMM. The ToMM has two major functions. First it is able to infer the full range of mental 
states from observable behaviour. These include pretending, thinking, knowing, believing, 
imagining, and deceiving. Second, the ToMM is able to integrate this mental state knowledge 
into a useable theory which the child or adult can use to explain and predict other's behaviour. 
Baron-Cohen places particular emphasis on the EDD in his model, and in particular its links 
with the SAM. He maintains that the ability to detect eyes and eye direction, and thence to use 
gaze to figure out another's mental state is of extreme importance in mindreading. Although 
mental states can be inferred from other modalities, the eyes, he claims, are the best and most 
immediate "windows to the mind", and also the best indicators that we have "connected" with 
another mind when engaging in joint attention. 
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  Box 2: The Eye as Visual Stimulus 
In what sense might there be something special or dedicated about the processing system that 
leads from the retinal image to a representation of someone's gaze direction? The step that brings 
about the explicit representation of eye direction must be dedicated. However, in getting to that 
point, perhaps the system employs specialised neural pathways that otherwise do nothing; or 
perhaps the system manages to use neurones that already exist for other purposes right up to the 
input to that very final stage. Does the eye get its special effect because it is an ordinary sort of 
stimulus treated by a specialised process or because the eye is an especially suitable kind of 
stimulus for the purpose of communicating eye direction processed in the ordinary way? 
It can be easily shown that the eye, as a visual stimulus, has a number of simple and 
potentially powerful featuresa.. Figure 1 shows images of an eye. Superimposed on each is a 
pattern which shows the spatial variation in the amplitude of the response of vertically oriented 
simple cells from striate cortex. As can be seen, the cells respond vigorously over the whole of 
the eye. The response is in three spatially separate parts: one to each of the two visible parts of 
the sclera and one to the iris/pupil. As the eye turns, the response to the two scleral parts alter in 
their relative strength (in proportion to the respective areas). Thus, the contrast of the response of 
the two scleral parts is a monotonic function of eye direction. Eye direction is therefore a 
particularly simple measurement to perform on an image of the eye. The reason for this lies in 
the form of the eye and its interaction with the functional properties of cortical simple cells. 
Scleral contrast actually computes something that is hybrid between absolute eye direction in 
space and eye direction relative to head direction. If the gap between the eyelids (the palpebral 
fissure) were planar and oriented in the fronto-parallel plane, then sclera contrast would measure 
eye direction entirely relative to head direction. However, this gap actually curves around the 
eyeball. As a result, scleral contrast measures eye direction entirely absolute in space from any 
viewing directions where the corner of the eye (the lateral canthus) is out of sight round the 
eyeball. In fact, the gap between the eyelids extends for about 130˚ with the corner of the eye 
being about 75˚ away from straight ahead. Therefore, if treated as if it were the measure of 
 absolute eye direction, scleral contrast would lead to small errors in judging eye direction for 
views of a person when they were not facing you, errors that increased as the head angle turned 
away from you, exactly as have been foundb. 
All of this leads to the suggestion that the eye is a special stimulus in the sense that useful 
information can be recovered from it with robust simple processing mechanisms. The 
implication of this is that the processing system involved could be correspondingly un-special.  
References 
a Watt, R.J. (1999). What your eyes tell my eyes, and how your eyebrows try to stop them. 
Paper presented at Tenth International Conference on Perception and Action - ICPA-X, 
University of Edinburgh, August 1999 
b Anstis, S.M., Mayhew, J.W. & Morley, T. (1969) The perception of where a face or television 
‘portrait’ is looking. American Journal of Psychology 82, 474-489 
 Box 3: Social Directional Cues Trigger Reflexive Shifts of Attention 
Most of us have experienced the tendency to look where others are looking. In the middle of 
your next conversation, for instance, suddenly shift your gaze, or turn your head to look at 
something, and observe your conversational partner's behaviour. Anecdotally then, there appears 
to be some suggestion that shifts in another's line of regard might trigger shifts in an observer's 
visual attention. In fact, recent studies by three independent groupsa-c have provided some 
empirical evidence to support this claim. All three groups adapted the cueing paradigm devised 
by Posnerd to demonstrate that socially relevant cues such as eye-gaze direction and head 
orientation trigger reflexive shifts of a viewer's visual attention. 
In the study conducted by Langton & Brucec, participants were asked to press the space bar 
on a keyboard as soon as they detected a target letter which could appear at one of four locations 
on a computer monitor. Either 100 ms or 1000 ms prior to the appearance of the target, a face 
appeared in the centre of the screen that was oriented toward one of the possible target locations 
(see Figure 1). Targets could therefore appear in either cued or uncued locations. Participants 
were told (correctly) that following the appearance of a face, the target letter was equally likely 
to appear in any of the four possible locations. In other words, the cue was completely 
uninformative regarding the likely location of the target and therefore should be ignored. 
However, the results indicated that participants were not able to comply with these instructions. 
At the shorter, 100 ms cue-target interval, detection times were faster for targets appearing in 
cued locations than for those appearing in uncued locations. However, this cueing effect had 
vanished within 1000 ms of the presentation of the face cue (see Figure 2).  
On the basis of this pattern of results, Langton and Bruce concluded that the face cues 
triggered a kind of reflexive or exogenous shift of visual attention that is normally associated 
with a change in luminance, or the abrupt onset of a stimulus in the periphery of vision. Identical 
conclusions were reached by Driver et al.a and Friesen and Kingstoneb who obtained broadly 
similar results using eye-gaze direction as their cueing stimuli.  
 However, there are reasons to believe that the shifting of attention in response to head and 
gaze direction represents a rather special form of reflexive orienting. First, directional cues such 
as arrows do not trigger reflexive shifts of attentione. Second, recent evidence suggests that the 
neural circuitry subserving reflexive shifts of attention in response to socially irrelevant stimuli 
(e.g., abrupt onsets and luminance changes) is different from that involved in the orienting 
response triggered by gaze cuesf. The latter involves lateralised cortical pathways, whilst the 
former depends on subcortical pathways that are shared between the cerebral hemispheres. 
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 Box 4: The Direction of Attention Detector 
Perrett and his colleaguesa,b have suggested that something like an Eye Direction Detector 
(see Box 1) forms only part of a system designed to compute the direction of social attention. 
Their single cell studies have indicated that individual cells in the STS region of the macaque 
temporal lobe are sensitive to conjunctions of eye, head and body position. For instance, those 
cells which are particularly active when presented with a pair of eyes looking downwards also 
respond strongly when heads are directed downwards or when the body adopts a quadrupedal 
posture. Accordingly, they postulate the existence of a Direction of Attention Detector (DAD) 
which combines information from separate detectors analysing the direction of the eyes, head 
and body. However, how does the system respond when, say, the eyes might be looking 
downwards whilst the head is angled slightly upwards? Perrett's group have suggested that the 
DAD is organised such that information from the eyes will override any information provided by 
the head, and in turn, information provided by the head can override directional signals from the 
body. This is achieved by a network of inhibitory connections. Information from the eyes can 
directly inhibit cells coding an inappropriate head direction but not vice-versa, and similarly 
information specifying a particular head angle can inhibit cells coding an inappropriate body 
position but not vice versa. To return to our example, if the eyes are visible and are looking 
downwards whilst the head is directed upwards, the inhibitory connections will ensure that the 
input to the STS cells is restricted to information provided by the eyes and the direction of 
attention will therefore be coded as downwards (see Fig. 1). Social attention can also be 
computed under a variety of viewing conditions. For instance, if the face is viewed at a distance, 
or if the eyes are obscured by shadow, the system defaults to signalling the direction of attention 
from the orientation of the head, or if this too is obscured, from the orientation of the body. 
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 Fig. 1. Head orientation influences the perceived direction of gaze. The top two pictures 
are taken from Wollaston's original paper. Face B seems to be gazing directly at the viewer 
whereas Face A appears to be looking slightly to the viewer's right. By covering the lower and 
upper parts of each face you can see that the eye regions of both are, in fact, identical. The lower 
two faces illustrate a similar effect with greyscale images. The eye region from D has been 
pasted onto C where the head is rotated slightly to the viewer's left. Each of fifteen people shown 
Face D decided the eyes were looking straight ahead rather than to the left. However, thirteen of 
a further fifteen people shown Face C decided the identical pair of eyes were actually looking 
towards their left (Langton, unpublished data). 
 Fig. 2. The stimuli used to examine the mutual influence of gaze and head orientation in 
the processing of social attention direction. 
 Fig. 3. Time (in milliseconds) to respond to the direction of the gaze, and the orientation of 
the heads of the images shown in Figure 2. Reaction times to gaze directions were affected by 
the congruity of the head orientation and reciprocally, the time taken to respond to the head 
orientation was equally affected by the congruity of the gaze direction. (Data drawn from Ref. 
31) 
 Box 1, Fig.1. The relationship between the four components of Baron-Cohen's 
Mindreading model. The figure was adapted from one used by Baron-Cohenc . 
 Box 2, Fig. 1. The response of cortical simple cells to eye direction. When the eye is looking 
straight ahead (A), the output of the cells responding to the area of sclera on either side of the 
eye is roughly equivalent (the two white peaks shown in the image above the eye). As the eye 
begins to turn to the left (B and C), the area of sclera to the right of the iris increases relative to 
the area to the left of the iris. The relative strength of the cells' outputs corresponds to this 
change. This can be seen as one of the white peaks increases its height from B to C whilst the 
other peak's height is reduced. 
  
Box 3, Fig.1. The sequence of events in Langton & Bruce's precueing experiment. A 
fixation cross was presented for 1500 ms, followed by the appearance of a face cue which 
remained on the screen for 50 ms. The cueing faces were either looking upwards, downwards, to 
the left, or to the right. The target display was then presented either 50 ms or 950 ms after the 
disappearance of the cue. The time between the onset of the cues and the onset of the targets - 
the Stimulus Onset Asynchronies (SOAs) - were therefore 100 ms and 1000 ms respectively. 
Participants were asked to keep their eyes fixed in the centre of the screen and press the space 
bar as soon as they detected the target letter "o" regardless of where it appeared on the screen. 
The target display remained on the screen until participants had made their response. The screen 
then went blank and remained so for 1000 ms before the beginning of the next trial.  
 Box 3, Fig. 2. Detection times (in milliseconds) for cued and uncued targets as a 
function of cue - target stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The plot shows that at 100 ms 
SOAs, participants were faster to detect targets appearing in cued locations compared to uncued 




 Box 4, Fig. 1. The Direction of Attention Detector. This figure depicts a schematic 
representation of the connections and visual input to an STS cell (the large circle) signalling that 
another's attention is directed downwards. The cell receives excitatory connections from cells 
selective for the appearance of eyes, head and body directed downwards. Should the gaze be 
directed upwards, inhibitory connections prevent any response to the downward directed head 
and body cues. The figure was adapted from one used by Perrett et al.b 
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